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Abstract This paper concerns resource governance in a re-
mote Balinese coastal community, which faces severe environ-
mental challenges due to overexploitation and habitat destruc-
tion. It explores some of the issues raised in ‘social capital’
debates regarding leadership and public participation toward
sustainable natural resource governance. Given the strength of
Balinese customary law and the high degree of participation
required in the ritual-social domain, Bali represents a model
context for examining these issues. Through a case study of
destructive resource exploitation and evolving rules-in-use, this
paper analyses the ambiguous role of ‘bonding’ social capital
and the complexities of negotiating collective action on envi-
ronmental problems where conflicting interests and dense so-
cial ties make local action difficult. The paper finds that a more
complex appreciation of vertical (authority) and horizontal
(solidarity) relationships between leaders and ordinary villagers
is required, and that a more nuanced institutional bricolage and
exploratory scenario approach to analysis of evolving rules in
use would enhance associated policy interventions.
Keywords Tragedy of the commons . Leadership .
Community-based resource governance . Rules-in-use .
Scenarios . Bali
Introduction
Assumptions of the social capital thesis, that shared values and
dense associational ties contribute to good governance, are
currently being imported into natural resource management
literature as the practical failures of state and international
environmental agency interventions mount (Berkes and
Folke 1998; Pretty and Ward 2001; Agrawal 2002; Ostrom
2010; Guitierrez et al. 2011; Mitchell et al. 2015). Given their
policy-oriented focus, work in the area of ‘commons’ scholar-
ship has tended to follow Putnam et al. (1993) in seeking
horizontal ‘bonding’ social capital conditions in communities
that could contribute constructively to collective action on
natural resource management. These approaches have been
subject to criticism for their tendency to ignore the internal
structural complexity of communities, in particular the differ-
ent interests of local actors and especially those elites in a
position to capture the benefits of resource access (Agrawal
and Gibson 2001; Mosse 2006; Bebbington 2007; Li 2007;
Warren and McCarthy 2009; Fine 2010). Following Bourdieu
(1986) on the other hand, approaches to the question of ‘elite
capture’ tend to assume that those with strategic positions and
superior resources – including the extended networks that are
associated with ‘social’ capital formation and the ‘sym-
bolic’ capital that can be acquired through various
forms of culturally ascribed and achieved status (titles,
credentials, official positions) – will use that capital to
appropriate disproportionate benefit to themselves
(Platteau 2004; Abraham and Platteau 2011). This ap-
proach tends to color most discussion of ‘leadership’ in
the critical social science literature.
These are particularly acute issues in communities depen-
dent upon marine resources, which are regarded as more or
less classic ‘open access’ regimes because of the difficulties of
governing the mobility of fish resources and fishing popula-
tions (Marschke 2012: 39–56). Responding to the global de-
cline of fish stocks and marine habitats compounded by the
effects of climate change, will necessarily be dependent upon
developing much more effective governance regimes from
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global to local scale (Lockwood et al. 2012). At local level,
the problems of community participation, leadership and the
negotiation of horizontal and vertical structures through con-
servation interventions becomes an important consideration in
establishing the legitimacy and ultimately the long-term effec-
tiveness of sustainable co-management regimes (Bené et al.
2009; Guitierrez et al. 2011).
In Indonesia considerable attention has been given to custom-
ary (adat) governance mechanisms and resource management
practices that suggested possibilities for building networks of
locally managed sustainable fisheries (Thorburn 2000; McLeod
et al. 2009). These offered the prospect of linking local protected
no-take areas and restricted harvesting zones to wider marine
protected area networks in which locally managed resource use
could be negotiated to take account of customary rights and
practices as well as livelihood needs. Critical perspectives on this
customary governance approach revolved around the complexity
of community structures and failure to recognize how internal
inequalities complicate these conservation approaches (Bailey
and Zerner 1992; Pannell 1997; Brosius et al. 2005; Afiff and
Lowe 2008; Davis and Ruddle 2012).
Elinor Ostrom’s most recent work on commons governance
indicates a much more qualified perspective on the institutional
determinacy of vicious and virtuous cycles in the relationship
between structure, agency and institutional design (Ostrom
2010: 163). This paper explores the importance and limitations
of the narrow institutional focus that has been characteristic of
community resource management theory and policy to date,
and consequently pursues prospects for the broader, more flex-
ible and context sensitive approach suggested by Frances
Cleaver’s (2002, 2012) ‘institutional bricolage’ framework.
The Bali case study elaborated below serves to qualify a
number of assumptions associated with the social capital the-
sis and allied conservation policy approaches. First of all, the
case shows that high levels (especially of the ‘bonding’1 type)
of social capital may actually inhibit the resolution of com-
mons governance issues through collective action under cer-
tain conditions. In the Bali case leadership was constrained by
horizontal social ties, although a high level of ambivalence
among leaders as well as ordinary villagers is evident because
of the pervasive conflict between short-term economic needs
and long-term environmental wellbeing. It is argued that
an institutional bricolage framework offers a realistic
approach to the equivocation arising from this ambiva-
lence. In this more context specific analysis and policy
framework, leadership – exercised by elites as well as
ordinary villagers, insiders as well as outsiders, in for-
mal as well as informal contexts – engages vertical and
horizontal agencies in a more polycentric, open-ended
and ongoing negotiation process toward improved re-
source governance.
Bali Coastal Community Case Study
Given the strength of Balinese customary law (adat), and the
high degree of participation traditionally required in the ritual-
social domain, Bali represents an ideal-typic case for examin-
ing questions central to the adaptation and extension of cus-
tomary governance practices to contemporary community-
based resource management (Warren 1993, 2005). This case
study examines limits to the extent to which the horizontal
dimensions of customary governance regimes may be trans-
ferred to contemporary natural resource management and
challenges simplistic assumptions regarding the role of lead-
ership and elite control of material and institutional resources
(Knudsen 2013). The paper argues that the complexity of
vertical and horizontal relationships in the Balinese context
points to the importance of considering the interdependence
between both dimensions of this binary in the literature on
social capital described above and elaborated in the introduc-
tory chapter to this volume (Warren and Visser 2016).
The research for this case study formed part of a wider
comparative project on ‘Social Capital, Natural Resources
and Local Governance in Indonesia’.2 It involved mixed-
method quantitative (survey) and qualitative (participant ob-
servation and interview) approaches. A random sample house-
hold survey, including questions on socio-economic status,
involvement in village level decision-making, and attitudes
to local environmental issues was conducted with 40 house-
holds, geographically distributed across the 5 hamlets in this
village. Field research took place over annual periods of sev-
eral weeks to a month from 2010 through 2015. Recorded in-
depth interviews with local leaders, including village and
hamlet heads, customary community leaders, government
agents and fishers’ cooperative members provide the source
of direct quotations translated by the author, and give voice to
the range of perspectives on resource decline in this village.
An ethnographic approach to researching local resource issues
enabled analysis to take account of the specificities of the local
needs, understandings and practices that in this case led to the
destructive seaweed harvest of 2012, the long period of inde-
cisive debate concerning its regulation, and the complex insti-
tutional ‘bricolage’ scenario which appears to have brought
resolution.
1 Several types of social capital, which refers to high levels of civic
engagement posited to contribute to more effective governance, have
been identified in the literature sparked by this debate. The 'bonding' type
refers to internal solidarity within common interest communities or
groups; bridging and linking social capital refer to relationships between
horizontally and vertically related groups or institutions respectively (See
Warren and Visser 2016 this volume; Fine 2010; Pretty et al. 2003;
Woolcock 2001).
2 The research was funded by the Australian Research Council
(DP0880961).
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The location of the case study is the village of Perancak, a
remote fishing community on the far west coast of Bali, until
recently classified by the government as a ‘desa tertinggal’
(socio-economically ‘left-behind village’). Located along a nar-
row strip of coast between the Perancak River and the Bali
Strait, a three-hour drive from the provincial capital of
Denpasar, this village faces a number of extremely serious
and interacting conservation issues affecting its primary coastal
resource base. These include overfishing, coastal erosion, man-
grove destruction and the endangered species trade. Over the
last two decades there have been responses of varying effec-
tiveness to some of these complex issues of environmental
degradation through a combination of local customary (adat)
and administrative government regulation, involving interven-
tions by external government agencies or non-government or-
ganizations. Among examples of collaborative engagements
between the local community and external stakeholders to-
wards improved resource governance have been efforts to deal
with mangrove destruction and sea turtle conservation.
Mangrove destruction for shrimp pond development and
firewood collection is generally regarded now to be effective-
ly controlled by a combination of customary village regula-
tions (adat) and the intervention of a joint government and
internationally funded fisheries research center, SEACORM,3
located near the village. Although there is still some low-level
firewood collection, local customary regulations and external
agency involvement are regarded as having successfully
halted mangrove clearing – although not before a large area
had been converted to shrimp ponds.
The second instance of partially successful co-management
has been the establishment of a sea turtle conservation group
in Perancak village. Bali has been the center of a now illegal
(but still substantial) sea turtle trade. AWWF campaign since
the 1980s brought about significant pressure for state legal
action to protect the tourism industry from threatened interna-
tional boycotts. At the instigation of a Perancak family group
that had traditionally hunted turtles, a WWF-supported turtle
nest protection program was established in the village in the
1990s. Although the project faces problems of funding conti-
nuity and compliance with best practice guidelines (Ross
1999), it has nevertheless survived for more than a decade
and is to date the most successful nest protection program
on the island.
Other significant environmental issues facing this commu-
nity that have had neither effective local action nor serious
attention by any level of government or outside conservation
body to date, include coastal erosion, unregulated tourism
development and overfishing.
GPS data shows that 60 ha of Perancak coastline has been
lost between 2000 and 2014 (pers com., Made Puriati,
16.7.15). This meant that a number of households were forced
to find residential land elsewhere in the village and that small
artisanal fishers’ outrigger mooring sites are threatened. This
ongoing loss of coastal land has spurred another socio-
economic problem, driving the sell off of land along the coast
to investors for tourism and real estate development. The
transfer of village coastal land ownership to foreign in-
terests also poses problems of beach access and landing
space for small fishers’ boats. While some concern with
threats to cultural and environmental values in the com-
munity has also arisen, the potential for low-skilled
youth employment in villas along the coast is seen as
an important alternative prospect given the declining
fishing industry.
Most serious for the long-term survival of the local fishery
and fishers’ livelihoods, are the unsustainable fishing practices
associated with the large commercial purse seine fleet that
operates out of the Perancak River. These boats, which have
been based in Perancak since the 1970s, serve several factories
on the other side of the river, processing a range of fish prod-
ucts from animal feed to canned sardines for the international
market. The purse seine boats take huge volumes of juvenile
fish in illegal 1 cm mesh-size nets.4 They frequently operate
illegally in the inshore zone, where they compete with small-
scale artisanal fishers using traditional outriggers (jukung).
Although mostly owned by non-Balinese from neighboring
villages, and despite longstanding tensions over inshore fish-
ing and net sizes, the fact that large numbers of Balinese vil-
lagers (including many small jukung fishers) are employed as
part-time crew on the purse seine boats, means that short-term
conflicting interests inhibit what local action might otherwise
pressure for law enforcement.
During the 2010–2011 season there was still some debate
in the village over the extent to which these practices
accounted for the severe drop in the sardine catch, from which
the commercial fishery has not recovered to date.5 Past pro-
tests by local small fishers’ cooperatives and calls on the gov-
ernment to enforce existing regulations on gear and catch
zones, and to implement the district government agreement
to limit the size of the purse seine fishing fleet through licens-
ing, had until 20146 fallen on deaf ears. Recorded landings of
fish at the nearby official auction centre (TPI), where the com-
mercial purse seine fleet land their fish, had risen from 6.6
million kg in 2006 to 21.8 million kg in 2009, but dropped
3 SEACORM, Southeast Asia Center for Ocean Research and
Monitoring. The main objective of this government research station has
been the provision of satellite information to facilitate intensive commer-
cial fishing in the surrounding seas. More recently this brief has expanded
to include conservation issues.
4 National regulations required the purse seine net mesh be no smaller
than 1 inch (PeraturamMenteri Kelautan dan PerikananNo Per. 02/MEN/
2011).
5 On the decline of fish stocks in the Bali Strait Fishery, see ACIAR
(2011).
6 Potentially significant changes in central government policy that have
been introduced since the 2014 national election are discussed below.
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dramatically to 11.6 million kg in 2010 and 6.0 million in
2011, when sardines, the mainstay of the Bali Strait fishery,
comprised less than a quarter of the catch.7
Local Governance: Customary and State
Customary law (adat) is one local governance mechanism in
Bali that is regarded as a potentially effective approach for
dealing with environmental issues, especially in the post-
authoritarian period of decentralized governance in Indonesia.
Adat can be a powerful tool whenever it is possible to conjure
consensus and impose customary sanctions that for Balinese
have material, social and spiritual implications. But the powers
of local customary regulations do not extend beyond the
Balinese community that makes and enforces them. And so,
some issues, such as regulation of the large purse seine fishing
fleet and of tourism development, are largely beyond direct
local control. Where local management is possible, the difficul-
ties of achieving the community consensus that is prerequisite
to effective imposition of rules and sanctions cannot be
underestimated either, even in this high social capital context.
Revision of village customary laws (awig-awig), carried out
periodically through a process of lengthy community delibera-
tion and eventually consensual determination, theoretically of-
fered the opportunity to tackle some of these issues. After a
controversial process of revision, that did not include the exten-
sive public consultations normally required, the provisional
new village customary regulations (awig-awig pasuara) drafted
in 2011 barely touched on most of the serious resource gover-
nance issues described above. The process and outcome of the
awig-awig revision exercise give some indication of the kind of
internal tensions that critics of commons literature point to re-
garding the need to revise ‘romantic’ constructions of the ‘com-
munity’ concept and to recognize competing interests and the
potential for elite capture of local resources, including custom-
ary governance itself (McCay 2001; Brosius et al. 2005;
Davidson and Henley 2007; Thorburn 2000).
Beyond the inclusion of earlier regulations on mangrove
exploitation, the most recent revisions to the customary regu-
lations for Perancak either skirt controversial natural resource
management issues or uncharacteristically refer their enforce-
ment to state law. The failure to address these issues and the
lack of customary due process was regarded by some villagers
as indicating ‘elite capture’ of the customary decision-making
process. The recently elected adat head of the village
(Bendesa) was a relative of the then official village head
(Perbekel) in the dual customary (adat)–state (dinas) local
governance structure that has prevailed in Bali since the colo-
nial period. Both adat and dinas village heads were among the
few Balinese that owned purse seine boats, until the crash in
the sardine fishery in 2011, when the adat leader could not pay
his debts and had to sell off his boats. Both official and cus-
tomary village heads were democratically elected, although
both were believed to have ignored serious issues that con-
flicted with their private interests. An example of outright elite
capture of development resources was the use of government
community development grants (PNPM) to purchase four flat
bottomed sampan owned by the administrative village head
for use as tourist boats. More appropriate would have been an
arrangement to use the traditional jukung outriggers, which
would showcase local heritage while providing income to
small-scale fishers. But with this exception, most villagers
interviewed regarded the distribution of development funding
for projects and employment through the core government
community development program (PNPM) as fair, although
many disliked the administrative village head’s arrogant man-
ner, which eventually led to defeat in his bid for re-election.
Beyond the vested interests of elected village officials, we
need to consider also the complexity of the interconnections,
dependencies and conflicting interests that we have come to
recognize as characteristic of all ‘communities’ if we want to
understand why collective action on critical environmental is-
sues does not necessarily arise despite these being serious local
concerns. Under normal circumstances cohesive communities
often tolerate rule bending and permit everyday ‘business as
usual’ practices to proceed in the interests of stable social rela-
tions – although not without the gossip, suspicion, righteous
indignation and other forms of contestation born of competing
perspectives and interests that pervade even the most ‘homoge-
neous’ and ‘bonded’ of adat villages. Local leaders and pow-
erful elites8 cannot be completely insensitive to these horizontal
rumblings that erupt in periodic outbursts at village meetings, in
jokes and tirades in the local coffee shop, or in satire that has the
quintessential appeal of a strong subversive comic tradition in
Balinese artistic performance, a requisite part of all major cer-
emonies in the annual ritual cycle.
Exploring this theme further, the paper now turns to an
example of collective action failure on a significant environ-
mental issue in this high social capital context. The incident
described below raises important questions about the relation-
ship between horizontal and vertical dimensions of local so-
cial structure that are of wider significance than much of the
literature on either ‘elite capture’ or exemplary leadership
(Guitierrez et al. 2011; Knudsen 2013) in cohesive contexts
suggests.
7 Data Produksi/Pendaratan Ikan TPI Pengambengan Tahun 2003 - 2009,
2010, 2011, 2014.
8 ‘Leaders’ and ‘elites’ are treated in this paper as partly overlapping
categories: the former exercise influence and authority that may be formal
or informal, but that are based primarily on socially recognized personal
qualities that are ideally disinterested and oriented toward the common
good, while the latter are able to exercise authority and/or influence based
on their structural political, economic or social status positions that may
be independent of personal leadership qualities.(Cf. Amsden et al. 2012)
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Collective Action Failure: Ravaging Coastal
Seaweed Beds
In 2012, the year following the collapse of the Bali Strait
sardine fishery, a trader came to Perancak from Surabaya of-
fering villagers cash9 to harvest the natural seaweed bed along
the eastern end of the Perancak coastal strip. Seaweed (known
locally as bulung jaje) is used for making agar-agar, cosmetics
and other products, and had a high market price at the time.
Because of the drastic decline in the local fishery during the
previous two years, villagers were desperate for income, and
joined in an open harvest, ravaging the previously undamaged
area of the village coastline of its seaweed beds. Two months
later, in May 2012, rough seas and unusually high waves
ripped several metres from the already seriously eroding
coastline in precisely the area where the seaweed harvest
had taken place. Discussions with local fishers, fishing coop-
erative and hamlet leaders reveal the complexity of the ‘drama
of the commons’ that ensued.
NK, a fishing cooperative member and head of the admin-
istrative hamlet (banjar) that stretches along the affected strip
of coastline found it impossible to intervene directly in the
face of conflicting economic needs and cultural values. He
believed there was need for both formal state and customary
regulation:
The traders came with trucks from Surabaya offering
cash to collect the seaweed (bulung jaje). People used
to collect the bulung jaje flower for cooking before, but
there was never anyone to sell it to. People from all over
the village joined the harvest. In two weeks it was fin-
ished. There is only stubble left. I didn’t dare say any-
thing. I couldn’t prohibit it. There has been a long period
of scarcity this fishing season and everyone would pro-
test. I certainly couldn’t do that in the atmosphere of a
forthcoming election. People came from SEACORM to
watch but didn’t do anything either. There are no regu-
lations prohibiting this, not like there are for coral or
mangrove. Only later did the community regret it…. In
fact, even while it was going on some of those who had
participated in the harvest, came to me telling of dreams
they had. One of them told me that he had been visited
by a tall, old man in his dream. The spirit said: BWhy are
you bothering my place^, and he stopped [harvesting
seaweed]. Three villagers came to me with similar
stories of warnings they had in their dreams. But I
couldn’t really do anything. Only now are the commu-
nity feeling the effects. The stubble is still there, so may-
be it will grow back. The fish used those areas for hiding
from prey and laying eggs. The sea turtles used it as
food, and the roots hold the sand in place. … Coastal
abrasion now is so bad everywhere, the whole of Bali is
going to sink and be destroyed, not just Perancak … if
the government doesn’t quickly do something about
protecting coastal areas. The problem is there is no reg-
ulation on seaweed collection, only on coral, the use of
bombs, and mangroves. There needs to be both adat
(customary) and dinas (state) regulation to be strong
enough.
(Interview with NK 22/07/12)
A former customary (adat) hamlet leader and founder of
the turtle conservation project believed that there was collec-
tive moral responsibility to take action, irrespective of the lack
of formal regulations. He had been quietly promoting the idea
of a small no take zone in the area of the seaweed beds where
an underground cave, rock and coral reef formation remained
relatively intact, although he no longer had a formal position
of authority from which to do more than privately criticize his
fellow villagers. He described what happened with disdain:
…Without the sea grasses the sun’s rays go straight to
the coral and rocks, and fish won’t be able to lay eggs
there. The villagers had the excuse that their stomachs
were hungry. I said, BYou can’t take rocks [coral] with
that excuse. Aren’t we stirring up satan? If we used that
excuse to take away the coral, the world would go to pot
… We can’t go around killing people with the excuse
that we are hungry.^ I don’t knowwhy [we] Bali Hindus
are always talking about the Tri Hita Karana principle of
balance in the relationship between the gods and nature
and other people, but we never actually practice it. No
need for God to annihilate the earth, what a pity! – no
need! Let mankind do that to themselves if they abuse
[nature]. (Interview with WT 25/07/12)
The head of one of the small fishers’ cooperatives in the
village best expressed the situational ambivalence that is an
under-recognized aspect of commons dilemmas, and that un-
doubtedly explains a good part of the uncertainty that charac-
terizes so many outcomes in contested situations:
The impact was severe. Fish need the seaweed beds to
lay eggs, turtles for food. Before the seaweed beds were
finished off, they wouldmoderate the coastal current. So
of course the erosion now is more extreme. Uhh – tsk!
[Shook his head] But if we fault our fellow fishers, they
would be insulted and angry. Actually this is the respon-
sibility of the Department of Fisheries: if they had come
down, then we could have done something about it. …
Among one another, it would be explosive to go around
giving warnings. From the village head there was only
talk about where else to look [for seaweed]. SEACORM
9 Rp 1000/kg wet and Rp 1,300 (US$ .10-.13) semi-dried seaweed.
(interview KS 21/7/12).
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said that if the seaweed beds were finished off, there
would be an effect on the water movements and the fish
wouldn’t be there. But the fishers didn’t pay any heed.
They needed money. How many tons were taken away?
Maybe 50 tons. The blades were as long as my arm.
Perhaps I would have to be reincarnated four times to
the earth before they could grow back to their original
length. But rather than sit dumbfounded, I joined in the
harvesting. So I saw it all. It wasn’t that we didn’t all
know the effects of it; we felt forced to because of the
situation.… There was no money.
(Interview with KS 21/7/12)
These were all respected local leaders, themselves
fishermen – thoughtful, world-wise, straight talking, pri-
mary and lower secondary school educated – who gen-
erally fit the Balinese ideal model of local leadership. In
this instance they present themselves as ‘captured’ by
horizontal bonds as the dire economic situation pressed
for priority over environmental concerns. They saw their
position as characteristic of model egalitarian leadership
in customary institutions, likened in a Balinese proverb
to ‘leading a flock of drakes – you get all flack and no
eggs!’ In their leadership roles as first among equals,
they felt unable to act to restrain the free for all exploi-
tation of marine resources (cf Li 2014: 12).
The depth of competing subject positions (in particular
of short- versus long-term, and individual versus collective
interests) for those caught in such dramas of the commons
is expressed by the last quoted fishing cooperative leader,
who admitted joining the harvest himself against his better
judgment. Despite his own participation, he was a support-
er of the proposal for a no take zone in the area of the
harvest and of better government enforcement of existing
regulations, demonstrating that leaders’ individual ‘inter-
ests’ are not necessarily more coherent and consistent than
those of the communities they represent. His account
starkly reveals Hardin’s classic ‘tragedy of the commons’
scenario where individual short-term rational action con-
flicts with the long-term collective action required for
protecting environmental resources in the common interest.
All agreed that the critical issue was the difficulty of
achieving an active consensus on establishing restrictive
rules in the face of short-term need. Even the District
Fisheries Department official (Interview WK 25/07/12) re-
ferred to both horizontal sensibilities and vertical authori-
ties as his excuse for not intervening. He said he did not
want to prevent the seaweed harvesting out of human
sympathy for those facing economic difficulty. And be-
cause it was neither technically illegal nor on the radar
of the ‘higher ups’ in the bureaucracy, he had no real
power to do anything, although he also observed that the
long-term impacts would certainly be damaging.
These responses underline the importance of taking seriously
the ever-present (but usually short-term) conflict between liveli-
hood and sustainability discourses, and themultiple identities and
positioning of actors, which post-structural perspectives have
sensitized us to acknowledge, but which tend to slip from view
in legal and policy debates. The hybrid identities and competing
interests from which actors negotiate their positions on natural
resource management issues appear to be critical to understand-
ing the ambivalent and equivocal tendencies toward collective
action/inaction that contribute toward or undermine the potential
for constructive solutions to environmental problems – in this
case an acknowledged failure to deal with already well recog-
nized local environmental stresses in a crisis driven context. In
our 2011 research project survey of a geographic cross-section of
40 households in the village, undertaken the year before the
seaweed harvest event, 29 of 40 (73 %) respondents nominated
coastal erosion as a serious environmental issue that needed to be
addressed (2011 Survey: Q500). In response to a general ques-
tion on the most important challenges facing the village, envi-
ronmental issues ranked highest (14 of 28 responses), above
combined educational (2), economic (6), infrastructure (1), polit-
ical (4), and other (1) issues nominated by respondents (2011
Survey: Q304). Yet this relatively high level of awareness did
not immediately translate to a precautionary response to the sea-
weed harvest opportunity in 2012.
Power lies within Balinese communities to alter some as-
pects of the environmental challenges that face them through
both customary and official institutional means. The case of
the seaweed harvest suggests that the ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’ is in many contexts as much an effect of horizontal
relationships among fellow villagers as of vertical relations
between state or customary authorities and ordinary commu-
nity members. Responses from the range of local leaders quot-
ed above indicate that scholarly concern with ‘elite capture’
must also take account of ‘captured’ leadership who face se-
rious political risks and personal pressures where different
needs and interests threaten solidarities. Strong horizontal
bonds in situations of potential conflict may confound efforts
to challenge, recruit or constrain fellow subalterns to effect
what Hardin (1968: 1247) described as Bmutual coercion, mu-
tually agreed^ – his one local egalitarian-democratic option
for commons governance beyond the state and private models
that have dominated policy approaches until recently. It is
argued here that the relatively high level of bonding (internal
solidarity) social capital (Woolcock 2001), assumed to pro-
vide the very mechanisms that might construct a virtuous cy-
cle for engaging collective action, at the same time stood in the
way of addressing some of the key environmental issues in
this village. Given the high level of ambivalence and leader-
ship impotence reflected in these accounts of the seaweed
harvest, what prospect for resolving emergent environmental
issues requiring legitimate authority and mutually agreed
rules?
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Conservation Scenarios
In one of her last articles on institutions for collective action,
Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom (2014), whose
work has focused so prominently on common resource policy
issues, calls for research into the processes of ‘rule evolution’.
There is considerable reason to question the narrow and reified
focus on institutional rules that pervades so much of the litera-
ture on environmental governance (Cox et al. 2010). Yet the
timely emergence and deployment of ‘rules-in-use’, as Ostrom
(2005, 2014) refers to this key component of commons institu-
tion building, were regarded by local leaders as completely
lacking in the seaweed harvesting ‘tragedy’ in Perancak.
Ostrom (2010, 2014) struggles in this most recent work to
come to terms with the apparent indeterminacy presented by
the mixed body of evidence on local resource management
issues. She calls for detailed research that tracks the processes
of decision-making and the evolution of rules-in-use over time.
To this end she proposes that we use this research to model a
range of community resource governance scenarios derived
from empirical cases to explore where and how tipping points
in one direction or another occur. Mitchell et al. (2015) argue
that scenario planning can also be a valuable tool in the reper-
toire of approaches that enable adaptive co-management re-
gimes to turn vicious into virtuous circles by bringing together
scientific and experiential evidence, local social values and cul-
tural sensibilities into formal institutional frameworks for envi-
ronmental protection at all levels of governance.
Perancak presents a small but interesting case study for the
kind of scenario exploration that Ostrom (2010: 164) suggests
offers a way forward. Combined with perspectives from po-
litical economy and critical discourse analysis in such cases,
and sensitized by the bricolage perspective proposed by
Cleaver (2012), this approach requires us to track over time
the range of perspectives and collective action responses
among local actors and across institutional frameworks affect-
ed by the multiple serious environmental threats faced by this
community. It requires us to trace the points at which conflict-
ing interests, ambivalent positions and alternative options lead
local actors to engage or disengage, accommodate or resist,
become active citizens or desert the field.
Rather than solely focusing on the more or less formal
processes supposed to produce clearly legible outcomes,
Cleaver’s (2002, 2012) elaboration of institutional bricolage
as a complementary perspective to the rather more narrowly
instrumental and functional tendencies of the institutionalist
paradigm, recognizes less conscious and more conflicted pro-
cesses, which enable us to understand why purely ‘rational’
simplifications fail (2000; 2002: 15–16). It is also an approach
that recognizes the importance of the time factor, of tenacity,
commitment and responsiveness to the unexpected that have
become critical themes in recent common pool resource stud-
ies. In the ongoing saga of Perancak’s coastal degradation, we
need then to seek out those who have or could play roles as
institutional ‘bricoleurs’ (Cleaver 2002, 2012), through formal
or informal interventions, to contribute to effective and cultur-
ally relevant articulation of evolving rules-in-use.
In the case of the ravaged seaweed beds, the few villagers
who did not join the seaweed harvesting frenzy associated that
site with sacred/dangerous forces, apparently connected with
its special ecological features. Their interventions did not im-
mediately affect the destructive harvest, but did apparently
touch on sensitive cultural dispositions. According to the for-
mer customary community leader, WT, the reason this area
along the Perancak coastal strip had remained in relatively
pristine condition had to do with local cultural sensibilities
associating supernatural forces with the rock-cave-coral for-
mation that is fringed by the seaweed beds. The special char-
acter of the site was widely remarked upon, and the area was
respectfully avoided by most local fishers.
Following Ostrom’s suggestion that we give close attention
to the development of responses to specific cases of commons
management, this paper now considers a spectrum of scenar-
ios to model the range of potential pathways to improved
governance of coastal resources for Perancak. These involve
actors and institutions already in play, but place different em-
phases on the articulation of vertical and horizontal, formal
and informal governance relations, and implicate different
time frames and institutional resources.
Scenario 1 State government alliance with international
agencies (vertical, top-down, formal management
approach) – The global agency Conservation
International (CI) is in the process of promoting estab-
lishment of an extensive Marine Protected Area (MPA)
network to encircle Bali, mainly through lobbying pro-
vincial and district government departments to enact of-
ficial MPA declarations. This has been given traction by
the national plan, also pushed by the three collaborating
international conservation agencies (Conservation
International, World Wildlife Fund, The Nature
Conservancy) under the Coral Triangle Initiative, to ex-
pand Indonesia’s network ofMPAs to 20million hectares
by 2020.10 Past experience, however, demonstrates that
MPA declarations are unlikely to have meaningful out-
comes for coastal conservation andmarine biodiversity in
the absence of local engagement and support for enforce-
ment (McClanahan et al. 2006). Conversely, local efforts
will be difficult to make effective without at least official
recognition, and ideally an active commitment to shared
governance that has to date been lacking (Persoon et al.
2003; Lockwood et al. 2012). Undoubtedly, in the case of
the Bali Strait fishery, state enforcement of existing
10 See http://kkji.kp3k.kkp.go.id/index.php/en/informasi-konservasi/75-
targetkonservasi (2012) accessed 05/06/14.
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regulations on zones and fishing gears would be a signif-
icant starting point for building the trust in formal gover-
nance institutions, necessary also as a building block for
shared governance agendas.
Scenario 2 Local customary regulation with local NGO
support (bottom up, culturally framed, community-
based management approach) – Local knowledge and
the folk sensibilities to the site of spiritual significance
that troubled the former customary leader (WT) and
several villagers who resisted the seaweed harvest,
could be linked with the efforts of a local NGO that
has a community-centred approach to popularize this
site as a locally managed no-take area and re-enforce
knowledge and awareness of connections between reli-
gious, cultural and biological diversity values. Some
steps in this direction took place when a local NGO that
had previously been involved in community mapping at
Perancak brought the director of the Locally Managed
Marine Area (LMMA) network to the village to discuss
the former adat leader’s suggestion (WT quoted above)
of establishing a no-take area around the spiritually sig-
nificant site.11 That promising engagement did not have
any immediate result because LMMA hesitated to
stretch its scarce resources in the absence of strong local
consensus or evidence of customary institutional sup-
port. Although use of adat regulations had contributed
to stabilizing mangrove exploitation, adat institutions
were unlikely to deal with the seaweed harvesting or
unregulated fishing in the short term because of conflict-
ing interests and the tight grip that the related customary
and administrative village heads held at that time over
village government.12 Nonetheless, more concerted at-
tention to the informal aspects of local environmental
perceptions through this approach might have bridged
some of the tensions that emerged in the months follow-
ing the harvest, and cultural sensitivities undoubtedly
did feed into the subsequent turn of events that eventually
halted the harvesting practice three years later.
Scenario 3 Institutional bricolage (combining the po-
tential of vertical and horizontal institutional strategies
represented in scenarios 1 and 2, but giving more atten-
tion to process, meaning-making and actors’ ambivalent
subject positions in complex structural contexts) –
Building upon the formal institutional components
represented in Scenarios 1 and 2, while recognizing their
limitations, becomes the starting point for a more open-
ended trial and error approach to changing local practices.
Cleaver’s (2002, 2012) practice theory conceptualization
of institutional construction through bricolage – is fo-
cused more on the ad hoc and relatively less predictable
confluence of processes and events that influence agency
and shift or confirm existing practices and institutional
arrangements. A bricolage approach seeking to bring into
conjuncture some combination of existing institutions
and agencies, would explore a diverse range of potential
accommodations across governance scales. The hybridity
of actors’ identities and interests brings into play econom-
ic needs and calculating interests, as well as cultural as-
sociations, folk sensibilities, and social relational desires
for respect and regard, which can be used to re-enforce or
revise governance practices.
The aim of leadership in an institutional bricolage sce-
nario is to facilitate convergence through the combina-
tion of formal and informal processes that Cleaver’s
work is at pains to expose: BThe evolution of collective
decision-making institutions may not be the process of
conscious selection of mechanisms fit for the collective
action task (as in Ostrom’s model), but rather a messier
process of piecing together shaped by individuals acting
within the bounds of circumstantial constraint^ (2002:
17). Cleaver’s institutional bricolage embeds arrange-
ments in B….networks of social relations, norms and
practices … in which maintaining social consensus
and solidarity may be equally as important as optimum
resource management outcomes^ (2002: 17). These net-
works and norms include the very horizontal social re-
lations of bonding social capital that inhibited collective
action against the damaging natural seaweed harvest,
but could equally underpin solidary collective action
responses under more accommodating circumstances
(Warren 1993). At the very least, they prompt consider-
ation of the reciprocities and equities that must be ad-
dressed to enable more positive and enduring outcomes.
The bricolage scenario is undoubtedly prone to the same
unintended consequences and perverse outcomes that plague
planned formal institution-building approaches summarized
in Scenarios 1 and 2. But if pursued seriously, it opens con-
servation and development engagements to a more responsive
repertoire of options and broadened concept of leadership as
changing circumstances present themselves. In the case of
particularly activist or charismatic leadership, decisive out-
comes might be conjured, but in the everyday world of local
governance progress mostly presents itself as incremental ‘im-
provisations’ pieced together Bto address everyday
challenges^ (Cleaver 2012: 46). This approach would not rely
on a one-size-fits-all template simplistically represented here
11 See the Steenbergen essay (2016) in this Themed Section of Human
Ecology for background on LMMA.
12 That situation changed when the official village head was thrown out
of office in the 2013 village elections. But his replacement has as yet
shown no interest in environmental management issues. The adat head,
also the butt of considerable local disaffection because of his non-consul-
tative style, has meanwhile turned his economic interests to the fish trad-
ing business run by his son, which in 2013–14 started to include seaweed
trading.
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by Scenario 1 or 2, but an actor and process-focused
conjunctural approach that recognizes competing structures
and forces, and would ideally be paralleled by a more critical
and flexible action research agenda. The kind of social and
cultural embedding that Cleaver speaks of could alsomake the
underpinnings of emerging responses more durable and adapt-
able in the long run. The bricolage approach recognizes that
what does or does not work at one place and time may yet find
a place in different temporal and spatial conjunctures. This
approach fits well with the growing interest in adaptive co-
management and social learning processes, but requires a
more organic approach to the informal aspects of these pro-
cesses and presupposes less bounded time frames.
Reflections on ‘Institutional Bricolage’
and Emerging ‘Rules-in-Use’
Something approximating a modified version of the compos-
ite third scenario seems to have emerged in the wake of an
abrupt turn in the official position on fisheries policy as a
result of the 2014 Indonesian national election. Under the
populist President Widodo (who was elected from outside
the national political establishment), food security, sustain-
ability and the situation of small-scale producers have been
highlighted as new policy priorities, replacing the previous
government’s narrow focus on productivity increases. The
newly appointedMinister of Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, issued
regulations banning trawl and purse seine technologies be-
cause of their environmental impacts and declared a morato-
rium on new commercial fishing permits.13 She also began
hard line law enforcement against foreign vessels fishing ille-
gally in Indonesianwaters, a popular intervention with domes-
tic fishers (Jakarta Post 2015a, 2015b).
In the wake of decisive and controversial policies from the
new Fisheries Minister, the unrestrained and opportunistic
harvesting of the natural seaweed beds that began in
Perancak in 2012 halted suddenly in mid-2015. While it
may appear that the end to the harvesting of seaweed follows
the logic of Scenario 1, with heavy-handed action by formal
government authorities determining the outcome, this is not
the local interpretation. The local leaders interviewed previ-
ously regarded this recent about face as a meeting up of the
hitherto unsuccessful efforts of some villagers to restrict or
prohibit the harvest with new state policies that were broadly
committed to natural resource conservation.
Minister Pudjiastuti’s reputation as a strong-willed, no-
nonsense authority figure, under a government that claims to
be committed to fair resource access, undoubtedly gave dis-
proportionate symbolic weight to the installation of a sign on
Perancak beach spelling out heavy penalties for infringement
of the Conservation Act – a maximum of 100 million rupiah
(US$10,000) in fines and 5 years jail to any person Btaking,
felling, possessing, destroying protected plants or animals^
(Law#5/1990: §21[1]). Yet the Natural Resource and
Ecosystem Conservation Act quoted on the sign has been
national law since 1990, and does not include any reference
to seaweed as a protected species. In other words, no official
change in formal state regulations affecting the harvest had
taken place; nor was there any immediate threat to apply this
law directly to seaweed harvesting locally. Yet the national
context appears to have been a tie-breaker, stimulating con-
juncture between local and national environmental
sensibilities.
The failure of scenario 1 resulted from a lack of engage-
ment and interest from state authorities and their failure to
adapt and enforce even those regulations that were already
on the books with respect to fishing gears and zoning – no
less the capacity of these distant state authorities or global
NGOs to respond to a suddenly arising local coastal manage-
ment challenge. The failure of scenario 2 resulted from hori-
zontal differences of need, interest and interpretation in the
local sphere. Under economic pressure arising from the col-
lapse of the sardine fishery villagers needed this new source of
income. Some rationalized that coastal abrasion was an ongo-
ing environmental problem with external causes beyond local
control. No consensus was reached and no local authorities
were prepared to intervene on the grounds of economic need,
social pressures, and equivocal interpretations of long-term
impacts.
It remains to be seen to what extent the emerging bricolage
scenario will consolidate around better resource governance
and sustainable local practice more generally. Uncertainty re-
mains whether enforcement of marine conservation law will
be even-handed, in particular whether new regulations
prohibiting purse seine fishing will actually be enforced and
with what social, economic and environmental consequences.
So far changes to the gear and practices of the purse seine fleet
appear to have been deferred to future license renewal, and in
this regard questions must be raised about the political clout of
the owners of the commercial fleet and the political economy
of law enforcement in the resource management sphere.14
An important lesson that should be drawn from the context
rich bricolage approach is that it would be a mistake to regard the
seaweed harvest issue as successfully resolved in the absence of
efforts to deal with the wider socio-economic conditions that
drove villagers to take advantage of this opportunity to improve
their livelihoods in the first place. Institutionalization of new
rules-in-use for protection of the natural seaweed bed and the
13 See Indonesian Minister of Fisheries and Marine Affairs Regulations
56/2014 and 2/2015.
14 At a national level the tension between conservation and development
policies is evident in the blueprint for fastracking development in all
major sectors (MP3EI 2011).
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legitimacy of the so far implicit ban on harvesting will also de-
pend upon the extent to which the poorest who rely on the small
supplementary incomes from seaweed collecting are effectively
drawn into local social and economic development programs to
support diversification of livelihoods.
Although ‘resolution’ of environmental concerns may appear
to have been a largely chance conjuncture of forces in this par-
ticular case, it is possible to draw from the case study some
suggestion of strategies that could increase the chances of posi-
tive conjuncture for the long-term. The PNPM community de-
velopment program15 engaged external facilitators, mainly from
NGOs, who worked with an elected village level (male-female)
pair of coordinators to assist their communitieswith development
planning. This worked well in some places and not others de-
pending upon the training, experience and commitment of these
internal and external roles and their links to local community
organizations. In Perancak, for the few years the PNPM program
operated, both village coordinators and external facilitators were
well regarded. It would be worth experimenting with similarly
systematic training and subsidy of a group of civil society actors
whose roles would be to stimulate community development and
conservation planning, through greater participation of fishers’
cooperatives and other local associations, as well as collaboration
and knowledge sharing with other villages facing analogous is-
sues. This could take place alongside action research approaches
that introduce participatory exploration of scenario options as a
means of seeking out the points at which institutional bricolage
might be effected (Mitchell et al. 2015). Whether engineered
through external interventions, devised in response to crisis, or
conjured from more inchoate sensibilities, fine grained, long-
term investigation of these processes would offer important con-
tributions toward a deeper understanding of processes that build
constituencies for conservation and sustainable use.
Co-management approaches also need to recognize the im-
portance of going beyond formal institutional frameworks to
deal with the complexities of ordinary communities facing
sustainability challenges to their livelihoods. In this regard
there is all the more potential from seeking out Cleaver’s
‘bricoleurs’ through a more context sensitive approach to the
relationship between horizontal and vertical power relations in
local communities and by promoting expanded concepts of
leadership as well as new spaces for fostering it. Need this
‘institutional bricolage’ rely only on formally recognized
‘leaders’ and ‘elites’? Or might the evolving new institutional
brickwork also come from deeper sensibilities and more in-
formal intimations of concern, such as the dream warnings of
several Perancak villagers in the seaweed case? The
ambivalence of local leaders and the deep-rooted cultural
‘conscience’ of the resistant villagers suggest points of poten-
tial convergence between cultural and ecological sensibilities
that could contribute toward new ‘rules in use’ (see Cleaver
2000; Warren 2012) in the Perancak case. Driven by desire for
social regard or vested interest, by ancestral intimations or
other forms of moral suasion to contribute to collective action
by tapping into complementary inclinations among their fel-
lows, multiple bricoleurs’ actions could well contribute to
convergent sensibilities upon which more stable institutional
adaptations could be negotiated. The policy imperatives aris-
ing from this approach demand that we broaden analytic
frameworks of time and agency. At the very least, attention
to conflicting interests and ambivalent identities must be part
of this mix of policy, planning and adaptive practice.
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